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LABOR LAw-DUTY To BARGAIN-D1scLOsURE TO UNION OF CoSTs OF
NoNCONTRIBUTORY GROUP INSURANCE-In the course of bargaining for a new
contract with an employer, the union requested information regarding the
costs and benefits of a noncontributory group health insurance program1
which the employer provided for its employees. Petitioner provided a
breakdown of the plan's benefits but refused to disclose its cost. Charging
that this refusal amounted to a violation of the employer's statutory duty
to bargain in good faith about "wages,''2 the union procured the issuance
of a complaint by the National Labor Relations Board. The trial examiner concluded that such costs were costs of production rather than
wages and consequently did not have to be disclosed. 3 The Board disagreed and entered a cease-and-desist order. On petition to set aside the
order, and cross-petition for enforcement, held, order set aside. Only the
benefits of a health insurance program are emoluments of value includible
under the term "wages," and an employer is under no duty to disclose the

1 In a noncontributory health insurance plan the total premium is paid by the
employer, whereas in a contributory plan a part of the premium is deducted from the
employees' pay checks and the remainder of the cost is defrayed by the employer.
2 NLRA § S(a) (5), amended by 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1958).
a Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 924, 937 (1960) •
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cost of an insurance plan unless the employees contribute to the financing
of the plan or the employer interposes cost as a ground for refusing a
demand for increased coverage. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 291
F.2d 128 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 926 (1961).
The National Labor Relations Act provides that employers must bargain in good faith with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment."4 The act leaves the parties free to decide
whether to bargain about aspects of the employment relationship which
fall outside the scope of the mandatory bargaining provision even though
they may affect the well-being of the employees.5 The difficulties encountered in distinguishing between voluntary and mandatory subjects of
bargaining have in tum given rise to conflicts over what types of information management must disclose to labor unions. Requests for information
fall into two general categories analogous to the two categories of bargaining. The first involves information directly related to the "mandatory"
sphere of bargaining: e.g., "wage" data. Here the unions typically request
such information as individual wage rates, job classifications and rates,
incentive earnings, and the bases for merit increases. The courts have required employers to disclose such information,6 agreeing with the unions
that such data is essential if unions are to formulate and discuss demands
intelligently and police existing contracts.7 But, in addition, unions frequently ask for such non-wage data as costs of production, sales, return
on capital, profits, and cost-price schedules. 8 In this area the courts are
4 § 8 (d), added by 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d)
5 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S.
6 Sec, e.g.,
I. Case &: Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 149 (7th

(1958).
342 (1958).
J.
Cir. 1958); Boston HeraldTraveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956
(5th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954) ; NLRB v.
Yawman &: Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951). At first the courts were not
ready to say that an employer who did not disclose such information to the unions
should be found to be bargaining in bad faith as a matter of law, but only that this
would raise a prima facie presumption of bad faith. The presumption was rebuttable
by the employer's showing that the information requested was not pertinent to the
negotiations. See Pool Mfg. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 540, 550 n.11 (1946). But with the decision
in NLRB v. Yawman &: Erbe Mfg. Co., supra, the stage was set for the change from a
presumption into a legal conclusion, the court stating that it was "difficult to conceive
a case in which current or immediately past wage rates would not be relevant during
negotiations for a minimum wage scale or for increased wages." Id. at 949. The rule
was confirmed in NLRB v. Whitin Mach. ·works, supra, where the court said: "Refusal
by an employer to supply such necessary information makes impossible the full develop•
ment of collective bargaining negotiations which the statute intended to achieve." Id.
at 594.
7 See, e.g., J. I. Case &: Co. v. NLRB, supra note 6, at 153. See generally Di Fede,
Employer Duty To Disclose Information in Collective Bargaining, 6 N.Y.L.F. 400 (1960);
Sherman, Employer's Obligation To Produce Data for Collective Bargaining, 35 MINN.
L. REv. 24 (1950) .
B See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); International Wood•
workers of America v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1959). See generally Symposium,
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confronted with conflicting policy considerations. On the one hand,
management fears that by disclosing such data it will be forced to justify
its basic policy decisions to the unions.9 On the other, the unions argue
that any distinction is purely arbitrary, for once apprised of this information they will be capable of determining whether a company is able
to pay a higher wage by cutting production costs, absorbing the increased
wage cost, raising prices without losing its competitive position, or increasing productivity.10 In light of these opposing contentions a compromise
seems to have been reached wp._!:!reby disclosure will be required only when
"necessity" as well as relevancy is shown. Thus, the Supreme Court has
required a company to make known sufficient financial data to prove its
repeated contentions that it would be unable to meet the costs of the wage
increase requested by the union.11 But where inability to pay was not an
issue, such disclosure has not been required.12
Group insurance is now generally considered to be a subject of mandatory collective bargaining, for the financial cushion provided in the event
of illness is regarded as an emolument of value arising from the employment relationship and therefore is a wage.13 Unions claim that employer
costs of such programs are "wage data" which must be disclosed upon
request. In cases involving a contributory insurance plan it has been
held that the union is entitled to such information. 14 The court in the
principal case felt that without the presence of a deduction from take-home
pay there was no direct connection between insurance costs and employee
wages, construing the term "wage" to include only the value of the benefits
derived from the plan. 15 However, the Seventh Circuit has apparently
ignored any such distinction and, without indicating whether the employees
What Kind of Information Do Labor Unions Want in Financial Statements?, 87
countancy 368 (1949) .

J.

Ac•

o See Sherman, supra note 7, at 34. See also NLRB v. ·wooster Div. of Borg-,Varner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
10 See International Woodworkers of America v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir.
1959) ; Symposium, supra note 8, at 368.
11 NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
12 International Woodworkers of America v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir.
1959) . "[W]ages and hours are the heart and core of the employer-employee relationship, and information concerning existing and past wage rates and patterns is essential
to the union to enable it to bargain intelligently. This is not necessarily so with respect
to what the employer's records show about how much or at what cost or in what time
he produces his goods, and how or at what cost or in what volume he sells those products."
13 NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., 277 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. General
Motors Corp., 179 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1950); W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875
(1st Cir. 1949); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948) ; Potlatch Forests,
Inc. v. International Woodworkers of America, 108 F. Supp. 906 (D. Idaho 1951), afj'd,
200 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1953); Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952).
14 Stowe-Woodward, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 287 (1959); Skyland Hosiery Mills, Inc.,
108 N.L.R.B. 1600 (1954); Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp., supra note 13.
15 Principal case at 131.
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contributed to the financing of the plan, has required disclosure of cost
information solely on the belief that it was relevant wage data.16 This
seems the better view since the employer's costs are a labor cost to him
regardless of whether there is an additional contribution from the employee, and it would seem that in either case the employer's contribution
directly affects the employee's total wage to the same extent and in much
the same manner. Thus, if disclosure is to be mandatory under a contributory plan, as the court in the principal case admits,17 it should be
mandatory under a noncontributory plan as well.
Rather than concentrating on an illusory distinction, the court should
have focused its attention on the relevance of the information requested
by the union to its legitimate bargaining position. The Board's opinion
indicates that the union's request for information was based upon a desire
to substitute one type of benefit for another. 18 The union felt that since
the bargaining unit was composed of relatively young employees it might
be preferable to replace some or all of the retirement insurance included
in the plan with immediate cash payments in the form of higher wages.
Discussion of such changes in employee benefits is certainly within the
area of mandatory bargaining, and intelligent bargaining on this matter
by the union would seem dependent upon the information requested. The
court's finding of a lack of a significant relationship failed to respond to
the specific problem confronting the union.
Burton L. Raimi

16
17
18

NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., 277 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1960) .
Principal case at 131.
Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 924, 925 (1960).

